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Abstract
Anonymized data is highly valuable to both businesses and
researchers. A large body of research has however shown the
strong limits of the de-identification release-and-forget model,
where data is anonymized and shared. This has led to the de-
velopment of privacy-preserving query-based systems. Based
on the idea of “sticky noise”, Diffix has been recently pro-
posed as a novel query-based mechanism satisfying alone the
EU Article 29 Working Party’s definition of anonymization.
According to its authors, Diffix adds less noise to answers
than solutions based on differential privacy while allowing
for an unlimited number of queries.
This paper presents a new class of noise-exploitation at-
tacks, exploiting the noise added by the system to infer private
information about individuals in the dataset. Our first differen-
tial attack uses samples extracted from Diffix in a likelihood
ratio test to discriminate between two probability distributions.
We show that using this attack against a synthetic best-case
dataset allows us to infer private information with 89.4% ac-
curacy using only 5 attributes. Our second cloning attack uses
dummy conditions that conditionally strongly affect the out-
put of the query depending on the value of the private attribute.
Using this attack on four real-world datasets, we show that
we can infer private attributes of at least 93% of the users in
the dataset with accuracy between 93.3% and 97.1%, issuing
a median of 304 queries per user. We show how to optimize
this attack, targeting 55.4% of the users and achieving 91.7%
accuracy, using a maximum of only 32 queries per user.
Our attacks demonstrate that adding data-dependent noise,
as done by Diffix, is not sufficient to prevent inference of
private attributes. We furthermore argue that Diffix alone fails
to satisfy Art. 29 WP’s definition of anonymization. We con-
clude by discussing how non-provable privacy-preserving sys-
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tems can be combined with fundamental security principles
such as defense-in-depth and auditability to build practically
useful anonymization systems without relying on differential
privacy.
1 Introduction
Personal data holds a significant potential for researchers
and organizations alike, yet its large-scale collection and use
raise serious privacy concerns. While scientists have com-
pared the impact of modern large-scale datasets of human
behaviors to the invention of the microscope [1], numerous
scandals, such as the recent Cambridge Analytica debacle [2]
highlight the importance of privacy and data protection for
the general public and modern societies.
Historically, the balance between using personal data and
preserving people’s privacy has relied, both practically and
legally, on the concept of data anonymization. Anonymization,
also called de-identification, is the process of transforming
personal data to mask the identity of participants, e.g. by
removing identifiers, coarsening data, or adding noise. The
recent European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
defines anonymous information as “information which does
not relate to an identified or identifiable natural person or
to personal data rendered anonymous in such a manner that
the data subject is not or no longer identifiable” [3]. Similar
definitions exist in other protection laws around the world,
such as the HIPAA privacy rule for medical data in the US
and the ePrivacy regulation. These all state that anonymized
data does not require consent from participants to be shared
widely, as it cannot be traced back and potentially used against
them.
While de-identification algorithms are widely used in in-
dustry and academia to transform and release anonymous
datasets, a large body of research has shown that these prac-
tices are not resistant to a wide range of re-identification
attacks [4–9]. Exposure of the limits of de-identification have
led to less than happy conclusions by policy makers: for
instance, the [US] President’s Council of Advisors on Sci-
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ence and Technology concluded that data anonymization “is
not robust against near-term future re-identification methods.
PCAST do not see it as being a useful basis for policy” [10].
Query-based systems. In response to the limits of de-
identification, privacy researchers and companies have pro-
posed query-based systems as an alternative. Such systems
typically offer data analysts a remote interface to ask ques-
tions that return data aggregated from several, potentially
many, records. Granting access to the data only through
queries, without releasing the underlying raw data, mitigates
the risk of typical re-identification attacks. Yet a malicious
analyst can often submit a series of seemingly innocuous
queries whose outputs, when combined, will allow them to
infer private information about participants in the dataset.
Differential privacy. Privacy research has been increasingly
focused on providing provable privacy guarantees to defend
query-based systems against such attacks. Differential pri-
vacy [11] is the main privacy guarantee considered by re-
searchers. Intuitively, a randomized algorithm is differentially
private if the output does not depend on any single individual’s
record in the dataset. It has been shown that algorithms that
satisfy differential privacy are robust to a very large class of
attacks [12]. Yet, efficient differential privacy mechanisms are
generally very use case-specific and, even if a large range of
differentially private mechanisms have been proposed, there
is still no practical widely deployed differential privacy so-
lution for general-purpose data analytics [13]. To achieve
strong privacy guarantees, practitioners must often sharply
limit the data utility by adding large amounts of noise and
restrict the total number of requests that the system is al-
lowed to answer [14]. Moreover, while differential privacy is
a strong guarantee, the risk of data breaches because of im-
plementation issues remains, exposing systems to attacks that
differential privacy should in theory rule out [15, 16]. Overall,
with some rare exceptions, the complexity of correctly imple-
menting differential privacy and choosing the right privacy
budget often prevents practitioners from using it.
Alternatives to differential privacy. Diffix, a patented com-
mercial solution that acts as an SQL proxy between an analyst
and a protected database [17, 18], has recently been proposed
by researchers affiliated with Aircloak and the Max Planck
Institute for Software Systems as a practical alternative to
differential privacy, based on the [EU] Article 29 Working
Party (Art. 29 WP)’s definition of anonymous data. It defines
a dataset as anonymous if the anonymization mechanism used
protects against singling out (identify one user), linkability
(match users across datasets), and inference (learn partici-
pants’ records) attacks [18, 19]. Diffix relies on a novel noise
addition framework called “sticky noise”, which aims to give
analysts a rich query syntax, minimal noise addition, and an
infinite number of queries, all while satisfying the WP29 defi-
nition of anonymous.
The authors claim that data produced by Diffix (i) falls
outside of the scope of the new European GDPR regulation;
(ii) has been determined by the French National Commission
on Informatics and Liberty (CNIL) to offer “GDPR-level
anonymization” for all cases; and (iii) has been certified by
TÜViT as fulfilling “all requirements for data collection and
anonymized reporting” [20, 21]. Diffix is used in production
and Aircloak reports working with partners such as Telefonica,
DZ Bank and Cisco.
Exploiting Diffix’s noise. In this paper we present a new
class of attacks, called noise-exploitation attacks. The attacks
work in three parts: (i) canceling out part of the sticky noise
using multiple queries, (ii) exploiting the noise Diffix adds to
one query in order to learn information about the query set
associated to this query, and (iii) using logical equivalence
between queries to obtain independent noise samples for the
same query. We develop two noise-exploitation attacks that
take advantage of the structure of Diffix’s sticky noise to
infer private (also called secret) attributes of individuals in the
dataset, violating the inference requirement from the Article
29 WP definition of anonymization [19]. Our first attack, the
differential attack, uses samples obtained by the difference
between two queries’ outputs, to discriminate between two
distributions, depending on the value of the private attribute.
We show that, under specific conditions, this attack potentially
allows an attacker to infer private information of unique users
with up to 96.8% accuracy knowing only 5 pieces of auxiliary
information we call attributes.
Our second noise-exploitation attack, the cloning attack,
uses dummy conditions that affect the output of queries condi-
tionally to the value of the private attribute. This attack relies
on weaker assumptions and automatically validates them with
high accuracy, without the need for an oracle. It proceeds
in two steps: (i) a validation step, searching for subsets of
known attributes to use for the attack, that will satisfy the
assumptions required for its success, and (ii) an inference
step that uses the attributes found to predict users’ private at-
tribute’s value. We perform the attack against four real-world
datasets, and show that it can infer the private attributes of
between 87.0% and 97.0% of all records across datasets. We
then present an optimized cloning attack that targets 55.4%
of the users and achieves the same accuracy using as little as
32 queries. This proves that introducing limits for the number
of allowed queries would not protect against our attacks.
Contributions. This paper makes the following contribu-
tions:
• By developing and implementing two attacks, we demon-
strate that Diffix alone does not currently satisfy the in-
ference requirements of the Art. 29 WP. We make the
datasets and code for the attacks and experiments avail-
able to other researchers.
• We show, using a collection of four previously published
datasets that the assumptions made by our attacks are
realistic. We establish that, across all datasets, between
2
93% and 100% of all users are value-unique (i.e. all
records sharing the same set of attributes have the same
private attribute).
• We make a range of defense-in-depth proposals, which
can be used to improve the practical privacy guarantees
of both Diffix and other non-differentially private data
anonymization tools. While these measures will not re-
sult in differential privacy guarantees, they might provide
adequate practical solution in many settings.
• We show, using the Diffix mechanism as our primary ex-
ample, that anonymization mechanisms that do not rely
on differential privacy might not be GDPR-compliant
alone, and that naive data-dependent noise can lead to
powerful attacks.
Paper organization. The rest of the paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 describes the Diffix mechanism. Section 3
presents two attacks exploiting the noise added by the system
to infer private attributes of individuals in the dataset. Section
4 shows, on real-world datasets, how an attacker can accu-
rately attack the Diffix mechanism. Section 5 discusses the
assumptions of the attacks and potential solutions for Diffix to
thwart noise-exploitation attacks moving forward. Sections 6
and 7 summarize related work and provide our conclusions to
build practically useful anonymization systems. Appendices
A–D provide some details and improvements for the statis-
tical tests used by the attack. Appendix E describes how to
optimize the cloning attack to reduce the number of queries.
2 Summary of the Diffix framework
Here we summarize the Diffix framework as described
in [18] and introduce notations for our attack. Diffix acts as
an SQL proxy between an analyst and a protected database D
where each row is an individual record and each column one
attribute. The analyst can send SQL queries to Diffix, which
will process the queries and then output a noisy answer.
We denote with AD the set of attributes in the database
D. For instance, AD could contain 4 attributes AD =
{gender,age,zip,HIV} with HIV a binary attribute (0 or 1).
A record x is a row of D with values for the attributes in
AD. For example, with AD as above, we could have x =
(M,27,55416,1). We assume, for simplicity, that there is one
and only one record for every user in D.
While Diffix can process a large part of the SQL syntax,
we here focus on simple count queries:
SELECT count(∗)
FROM table
WHERE condition1 AND condition2 [AND . . . ]
where every condition is an expression of the form
“attribute  value” with  being =, 6=, ≤, <, ≥, or >.
Figure 1: Diffix privacy-preserving architecture
For simplicity, we use a shorter notation for queries using “∧”
for the logical AND:
Q≡ count(condition1∧ condition2∧ . . .).
The following query would, for example, count the number
of individuals in the database who are male, 37 years old, and
live in the area with ZIP code 48828:
Q≡ count(gender = M∧age = 37∧ zip = 48828)
Diffix’s privacy-preserving mechanism. Diffix protects pri-
vacy through sticky noise addition (static and dynamic noise)
and bucket suppression (see Fig. 1). Let Q≡ count(C1∧ . . .∧
Ch), and denote by Q(D) the true result of Q evaluated on D
(without noise). Diffix’s output for Q on D (without bucket
suppression, see below) is:
Q˜(D) = Q(D)+
h
∑
i=1
static[Ci]+
h
∑
i=1
dynamicQ[Ci] (1)
with static[Ci] the static noise for condition Ci, dynamicQ[Ci]
the dynamic noise for condition Ci in Q.
Static noise. Let C be a condition, for example age = 34.
The static noise static[C] associated to C is a random number
drawn from a normal distributionN (0,1). The value is gener-
ated by a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), whose
seed is a salted hash of the string literal C:
static_seedC = XOR(hash(C),salt)
This ensures that the static noise associated with C is always
the same independently of the query where C appears. The
noise is “sticky” thereby preventing an attacker to send the
same query multiple times, average out the results, and obtain
a precise estimate of the private value (averaging attack) [18].
Dynamic noise. In the Diffix framework, every record in D
is associated with a user ID, a unique string for that user.
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These pseudonyms are used to compute the dynamic noise.
Let Q≡ count(C1∧ . . .∧Ch) be a query and C any condition
Ci. The dynamic noise depends not only on C, but also on
the query set of Q in the dataset D, i.e. the set of users which
satisfies all conditions C1, . . . ,Ch. More precisely, if the query
set for Q on D is S= {uid1,uid2, . . . ,uidm}, the dynamic noise
for C (dynamicQ[C]) is generated from a normal distribution
N (0,1) by the PRNG seeded with:
dynamic_seed = XOR(static_seedC,
hash(uid1), . . . , hash(uidm))
Note that we don’t include D in the notation dynamicQ[C], as
the dataset is usually fixed and clear from the context.
The output Q˜(D) is therefore the realization of a random
variable distributed as a normal distribution N (µ,σ2), with
mean µ = Q(D) and variance σ2 = 2h.
Example. Consider again the query
Q≡ count(gender = M∧age = 37∧ zip = 48828).
Diffix’s output for Q on the database D is
Q˜(D) = Q(D)
+static[gender = M]+dynamicQ[gender = M]
+static[age = 37]+dynamicQ[age = 37]
+static[zip = 48828]+dynamicQ[zip = 48828]
where Q˜(D) is a random value drawn from a normal distribu-
tion N (Q(D),6).
Static and dynamic noise layers are both needed to prevent
intersection attacks [17, 18], a class of attacks that combine
multiple queries to infer private attributes of records.
Bucket suppression. In addition to static and dynamic noise,
Diffix implements another security measure called bucket
suppression, similar to the classic query set size restriction. If
the size of the query set is smaller than a certain threshold, the
bucket suppression rejects the query. Previous research has
shown that a fixed threshold constitutes a risk for privacy [22].
Diffix addresses this issue by using a noisy (and sticky to the
query set) threshold. Specifically, suppose Diffix processes a
query Q≡ count(C1∧ . . .∧Ch). If Q(D)≤ 2, then the query
gets suppressed. If Q(D)> 1, then Diffix computes a noisy
threshold T ∼N (4,1/2), using the seed:
threshold_seed = XOR(salt,hash(uid1), . . . ,hash(uidm))
If Q(D)< T , the query is suppressed; otherwise, the noisy
output Q˜(D) is computed and sent to the analyst. In the origi-
nal Diffix mechanism [17], the queries are said to be “silently
suppressed” when censored by bucket suppression. This could
mean that (1) a value of 0 is returned as result, (2) a random
value is returned or (3) Diffix displays an error message. In
this paper, we assume that a bucket-suppressed query will
return a value of zero. This gives less information to a po-
tential attacker than an error message, as a value of zero can
be the result of either noise addition or bucket suppression.
We consider that returning a random result affects utility too
significantly to be applied in practice.
3 Noise-exploitation attacks
Our noise-exploitation attacks, which we call differential
and cloning, are both based on three observations. First, since
the noise is sticky, it is possible to cancel out part of it us-
ing multiple queries. Second, since the noise depends on the
query set, the noise itself leaks information about the query set.
Third, exploiting logical equivalence between some queries,
it is possible to circumvent the “stickiness” of the noise by
repeating (almost) the same query and consequently obtain in-
dependent noise samples. Our differential attack uses samples
in a likelihood ratio test to discriminate between two proba-
bility distributions depending on the value of the private (also
called secret) attribute. Our cloning attack relies on dummy
conditions that conditionally strongly affect the output of the
query depending on the value of the secret attribute.
3.1 Differential noise-exploitation attack
We first define further notations: with A ⊆ AD a set
of attributes, x(A) is the restriction of the record x to
A, i.e. the vector one obtains after removing from x ev-
ery entry for attributes that are not in A. For example, if
AD = {gender,age,zip,HIV}, x= (M,27,55416,1) and A=
{gender,age,HIV}, then x(A) = (M,27,1). If A contains a
single attribute a, we simply write x(a). So, for example,
x(gender) = M.
For this attack, we make the following assumptions:
H1 The attacker wants to find out some information about
Bob, the victim. The attacker knows that Bob’s record is
in the dataset. We denote Bob’s record by x. The attacker
has access to the protected dataset only through Diffix.
H2 The attacker knows all of Bob’s attributes for some set
of attributes A. Our background knowledge (also called
auxiliary information in the literature) is the restricted
record x(A). This is a standard assumption in the literature
on re-identification attacks [23, 24].
H3 The attacker wants to infer a secret attribute s about Bob,
the victim. That is, she wants to infer the value of x(s),
where s 6∈ A. For simplicity of notation, s is a binary
attribute, i.e. x(s) ∈ {0,1}. This means that the attack can
be seen as a classifier, with the output of the attack being
negative if the algorithm returns x(s) = 0 and positive if
it returns x(s) = 1.
While we here focus on the binary case, our results fairly
easily extend to non-binary cases.
H4 There exists an oracle Unique that takes as input any
restricted record z(R) and outputs whether z(R) is unique.
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Unique(z(R)) = True if and only if there is no other
record y in D such that z(R) = y(R).
For the attack to succeed, we first need to ensure that the
background knowledge x(A) uniquely identifies Bob. This is
given to us by the oracle Unique(x(A)). In this attack, we only
attempt to infer secret attributes of records that are unique in
the dataset. The cloning attack, presented later, extends this
by requiring a weaker notion of uniqueness, which we call
value-uniqueness.
While the existence of such an oracle is a strong assump-
tion, it is weaker than Diffix’s claims to protect against an
“analyst [that] has full access to the inference dataset” [18],
where the inference dataset is the original dataset with only
the secret attribute x(s) removed. If the attacker has access to
every record, she can easily verify that no other record shares
the same restricted record x(A).
Firstly, the attack needs to bypass bucket suppression. For
example, an attacker could ask how many records have both
the background knowledge x(A) and the private attribute s= 0:
Q≡ count(a1 = x1∧ . . .∧ak = xk ∧ s = 0). (2)
with A = {a1, . . . ,ak} and x(A) = (x1, . . . ,xk).
While an accurate answer to Q would immediately disclose
the value of x(s), since Q(D) can be either 0 (if x(s) = 1) or
1 (if x(s) = 0), this query will always be blocked by bucket
suppression since the query set is either empty or {Bob}.
Intersection attacks have been proposed in the literature
to circumvent similar kinds of restrictions [25]. Picking an
attribute, e.g. a1, we can define the following queries:
Q1 ≡ count(a2 = x2∧ . . .∧ak = xk ∧ s = 0) (3)
Q′1 ≡ count(a1 6= x1∧a2 = x2∧ . . .
. . .∧ak = xk ∧ s = 0)
(4)
As the record x is unique, by assumption, it is the only record
that can differ between Q1 and Q′1. This allows us to directly
compute Q(D):
Q(D) = Q1(D)−Q′1(D) =
{
0 if x(s) = 1
1 if x(s) = 0
(5)
To prevent this vulnerability1, Diffix adds static and dy-
namic noises:
Q˜1(D) = Q1(D)
+
k
∑
i=2
static[ai = xi]+ static[s = 0]
+
k
∑
i=2
dynamicQ1 [ai = xi]+dynamicQ1 [s = 0]
1For the intersection attack to be successful, both Q1 and Q′1 need to be
large enough to not trigger the bucket suppression. We discuss this assump-
tion later on.
and
Q˜′1(D) = Q
′
1(D)
+static[a1 6= x1]+dynamicQ′1 [a1 6= x1]
+
k
∑
i=2
static[ai = xi]+ static[s = 0]
+
k
∑
i=2
dynamicQ′1 [ai = xi]+dynamicQ′1 [s = 0].
The first part of our attack relies on noticing that k−1 static
noise layers cancel out. Let
q1 = Q˜1(D)− Q˜′1(D).
Then:
q1 = Q1(D)−Q′1(D)
−static[a1 6= x1]−dynamicQ′1 [a1 6= x1] (fixed)
+
k
∑
i=2
dynamicQ1 [ai = xi]+dynamicQ1 [s = 0]
(dynamicQ1 )
−
k
∑
i=2
dynamicQ′1 [ai = xi]−dynamicQ′1 [s = 0]
(dynamicQ′1 )
leaving us with 2k + 2 noise layers: fixed ∼ N (0,2),
dynamicQ1 ∼N (0,k), and dynamicQ′1 ∼N (0,k).
The second part of the attack relies on the fact that
both dynamicQ1 [ai = xi] and dynamicQ′1 [ai = xi] (resp.
dynamicQ1 [s = 0] and dynamicQ′1 [s = 0]) relate to the same
condition “ai = xi” (resp. “s = 0”). This means that the noise
values for Q1 and Q′1 will cancel out if Q1 and Q
′
1 have the
same query set. Therefore either Q1(D)−Q′1(D) = 0, and the
2k dynamic noise layers cancel out, or Q1(D)−Q′1(D) = 1,
and no dynamic noise layer is canceled out:
q1 ∼
{
N (0,2) if x(s) = 1
N (1,2k+2) if x(s) = 0 (6)
Using this result, an attacker can run a likelihood ratio test
(see Appendix A) to estimate whether q1 is distributed as
N (0,2) or N (1,2k+ 2) and predict the value of x(s). The
larger k is, the easier it becomes to discriminate between the
two distributions. This alone already allows the attacker to
infer Bob’s secret, x(s), with better than random accuracy.
The third part of the attack allows us to strongly improve
the accuracy of our inference. While the stickiness of the noise
prevents us from running the same query again to collect more
sample, we circumvent it by using different pairs of queries
for which equation (6) is still true. Specifically, instead of
removing (resp. negating) the condition a1 = x1, we remove
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(resp. negate) other conditions a j = x j for j ≤ k, obtaining
queries Q j (resp. Q′j) for j ≤ k. In our notation:
Q j ≡ count
 k∧
i=1
i 6= j
ai = xi∧ s = 0
 (7)
Q′j ≡ count
 k∧
i=1
i6= j
ai = xi∧a j 6= x j ∧ s = 0
 (8)
Running all queries {(Q j,Q′j)} j≤k, the attacker collects a vec-
tor of realizations {q j} j≤k where q j = Q˜ j(D)−Q˜′j(D). All q j
values are computed from different queries, which generate
different noises. Hence, the noises all have different values
(with probability 1). Nevertheless, the equation (6) is still true
for each q j, so we can combine them as k different samples
from the same distribution, and estimate the value of Q(D).
Finally, replacing the “s = 0” condition with “s = 1” in ev-
ery pair (Q j,Q′j) defines k new pairs of queries {(R j,R′j)} j≤k.
This allows us to obtain k more samples {r j} j≤k (with differ-
ent noises and inverted results in equation (6)). This gives us a
total of 2k samples before bucket suppression (see Appendix
A), generated by issuing 4k queries.
On a technical note, observe that in principle we cannot be
certain that the q j’s (resp. r j’s) are all independent samples,
because two different queries Q j and Ql (resp. R j and Rl) with
j 6= l might have the same query set. In that case, the dynamic
noise layers associated to the same conditions would have the
same values, and hence the total dynamic noises of the two
queries would be heavily correlated. While this affects the
accuracy of the likelihood ratio test, the impact is negligible
in practice. Hereafter, we always assume that the samples are
independent.
Example. We present an example of how the differential
attack would work in practice. We consider a dataset D con-
taining the attributes age, zip, and HIV, and assume that the
attacker knows Bob’s restricted record x \ x(HIV) for which
x(age) = 37 and x(zip) = 48828. As before, we assume that
Bob is the only user with both age = 37 and zip = 48828.
Consider the query:
Q≡ count(age = 37∧ zip = 48828∧HIV = 0).
which has true value 0 if Bob has HIV, and 1 if Bob does not
have HIV. To circumvent the bucket suppression, the attacker
defines two queries for the intersection attack. The first pair
of queries removes (resp. negates) the age condition:
Q1 ≡ count(zip = 48828∧HIV = 0)
Q′1 ≡ count(age 6= 37∧ zip = 48828∧HIV = 0).
Based on the previous findings, we know that q1 = Q˜1(D)−
Q˜′1(D) satisfies:
q1 ∼
{
N (0,2) if Bob has HIV
N (1,4) if Bob does not have HIV. (9)
The realization q1 is a first sample for our likelihood ratio test.
Repeating the same procedure with the zip attribute gives us:
Q2 ≡ count(age = 37∧HIV = 0)
Q′2 ≡ count(age = 37∧ zip 6= 48828∧HIV = 0),
and q2 = Q˜2(D)− Q˜′2(D) is again distributed as N (0,2) if
Bob has HIV, and as N (1,4) otherwise. This is the second
sample. Repeating the procedure defining queries R1 and R′1,
as well as R2 and R′2, and replacing HIV = 0 with HIV =
1 (and inverting the results), the attacker obtains two more
samples.
Full differential attack. For larger values of k, the queries
used by the differential attack contain many conditions, and
hence potentially select a low number of records. Depending
on the dataset, this might result in a large fraction of queries
being bucket suppressed, leaving the attacker with few or no
samples for the likelihood ratio test. To counteract this effect,
we integrate the attack with a subset exploration step to obtain
a full differential attack. Assume that the attacker knows a set
A∗ of the correct attributes for the victim with |A∗|= k∗, i.e.
the background knowledge is x(A
∗). The full attack proceeds
as follows. The algorithm selects random subsets of A∗ until it
finds a subset A⊆ A∗ such that Unique(x(A)) returns True. It
then performs the differential attack using x(A) as background
knowledge. For the likelihood ratio test, the attack considers
only query pairs (Q˜ j(D), Q˜′j(D)) or (R˜ j(D), R˜′j(D)) which
have outputs larger than zero in both entries. If no such pair
exists, the algorithm samples a new subset A and iterates
the procedure. If no feasible subset is found, the algorithm
outputs NonAttackable. The subsets of A∗ are sampled by
decreasing size, as bucket suppression is less likely for lower
values of k (but on the other hand the likelihood ratio test is
less accurate).
The procedure FullDifferentialAttack presents in detail the
algorithm outlined above.
3.2 Cloning noise-exploitation attack
In this section, we present an extension of the differential
noise-exploitation attack, which we call cloning attack. This
attack adds dummy conditions, that don’t affect the query set,
to queries, in such a way that several queries with different
dummy conditions will have either identical or very different
results conditional to the secret attribute’s value.
We first introduce some new notations and definitions. De-
noting by x the victim’s entire record, the attacker’s back-
ground information is now x(A) = (x(A
′),x(u)) with A = A′∪
{u} and |A| = k. We use the shorthand (A′,u) for A′ ∪{u}.
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Procedure DifferentialAttack(A,x(A),s)
Input: known attributes (names A and values x(A)),
secret s
Output: True if x(s) = 1, False if x(s) = 0, NoSamples if
x(A) does not yield any positive sample
1 k← |A|, Q← /0, R← /0
2 for j← 1 to k do
3 I←{i ∈ [1,k] | i 6= j}
4 Q˜← count(∧i∈I ai = xi∧ s = 0)
5 Q˜′← count(∧i∈I ai = xi∧a j 6= x j ∧ s = 0)
6 if Q˜ > 0 and Q˜′ > 0 then
7 q j← Q˜− Q˜′
8 Q←Q∪{q j}
9 end if
10 end for
11 for j← 1 to k do
12 I←{i ∈ [1,k] | i 6= j}
13 R˜← count(∧i∈I ai = xi∧ s = 1)
14 R˜′← count(∧i∈I ai = xi∧a j 6= x j ∧ s = 1)
15 if R˜ > 0 and R˜′ > 0 then
16 r j← R˜− R˜′
17 R←R∪{r j}
18 end if
19 end for
20 if Q= /0 andR= /0 then
21 return NoSamples
22 end if
23 f ← PDF of N (0,2), g← PDF of N (1,2k+2)
24 L←∏q∈Q f (q)g(q) ∏r∈R g(r)f (r)
25 return L≥ 1
Procedure FullDifferentialAttack(A∗,x(A∗),s)
Input: known attributes (names A∗ and values x(A∗)),
secret s
Output: True if x(s) = 1, False if x(s) = 0,
NonAttackable if x(A
∗) is not attackable
1 for k← |A∗| to 1 do
2 for iter← 1 to 100 do
3 A← RandomSubsetOfSize(A∗,k)
4 if Unique(x(A)) and
DifferentialAttack(A,x(A),s) 6= NoSamples
then
5 return DifferentialAttack(A,x(A),s)
6 end if
7 end for
8 end for
9 return NonAttackable
We also define a restricted record z(A) to be value-unique for
the attribute s in D if y(A) = z(A) implies y(s) = z(s). That is,
every record that shares the same attributes of the restricted
record z(A) holds the same value for the secret attribute s. To
simplify the notation, we write A′ = x(A′) to indicate the con-
dition that all attributes in A′ must match the ones in x(A′), i.e.
∧a∈A′a = x(a)
The attack addresses several limitations of the differential
attack, making it much stronger in practice.
First, the cloning attack does not require an oracle to con-
firm that the background information uniquely identifies a
user. Instead, it replaces the oracle with a heuristic to auto-
matically validate the assumptions.
Second, the differential attack has to ignore any pair
(Q˜ j(D), Q˜′j(D)) where at least one of the entries is not pos-
itive, as it cannot tell whether the null output comes from
noise addition or from bucket suppression. This significantly
reduces the total number of samples used. Our cloning attack
instead uses “dummy conditions” that do not impact the user
set. As queries now only differ in the dummy conditions, the
corresponding query sets will always be identical. This allows
us to rule out bucket suppression in case at least one output is
greater than zero.
Third, while the differential attack requires records to be
unique, the cloning attack only requires records to be value-
unique. This is a weaker condition and makes the cloning
attacks effective on a larger set of users.
Fourth, the cloning attack only requires that the set of users
who share all attributes in x(A
′) is “large enough” to not be
bucket suppressed. This is a weaker assumption than for the
differential attack, where this needed to hold for a large num-
ber of subsets of A with one attribute removed. Furthermore,
the cloning attack validates this automatically (and thus pre-
vents bucket suppression) with high confidence.
While much stronger, the attack relies on the attacker
being able to produce a set of distinct dummy conditions
∆ = {∆ j}1≤ j≤|∆|, where each ∆ j is an SQL statement such
that the set of users matching A′ = x(A′) is the same as the
set of users matching A′ = x(A′)∧∆ j. In section 5, we discuss
how dummy conditions are easy to obtain, slow to detect,
and how automatically filtering them might introduce new
vulnerabilities.
Description of the attack. For each dummy condition ∆ j,
we define the two queries:
Q j ≡ count
(
A′ = x(A
′)∧∆ j ∧ s = 0
)
(10)
Q′j ≡ count
(
A′ = x(A
′)∧∆ j ∧u 6= x(u)∧ s = 0
)
(11)
7
With q j = Q˜ j(D)− Q˜′j(D), we have:
q j = Q j(D)−Q′j(D)
−static[u 6= x(u)] −dynamicQ j [u 6= x(u)]
+∑
i∈A′
dynamicQ j [a
(i) = x(i)]+dynamicQ j [s = 0]
−∑
i∈A′
dynamicQ′j [a
(i) = x(i)]−dynamicQ′j [s = 0]
+
(
dynamicQ j [∆ j]−dynamicQ′j [∆ j]
)
By the same argument we presented for the differential
attack, if x(s) = 1 then Q j(D) = Q′j(D) and most dynamic
and static noises cancel out, giving:
q j =−static[u 6= x(u)]−dynamicQ j [u 6= x(u)] (12)
As this value does not depend on the dummy condition
used, we have that q1 = q2 = · · ·= q|∆|.
On the contrary, if x(s) = 0, then the noise layers do not
cancel out with probability 1. As the noise values given by
dynamicQ j [∆ j] and dynamicQ′j [∆ j] depend on ∆ j, the proba-
bility that all (or any) q j are equal is zero.
We can therefore complete the attack by inferring that
x(s) = 1 if q1 = · · ·= q|∆|, and x(s) = 0 otherwise. Under the
current assumptions, the attack always infers the correct value
with 100% confidence (up to pseudo-random collisions in
Diffix’s noise addition mechanism).
Robustness against rounding. In the previous section, we
follow the Diffix papers [17, 18] and assume that Q˜(D) is re-
turned directly without any rounding, admitting also negative
values. We now consider the case where results are rounded
to the nearest nonnegative integer, and propose a simple mod-
ification of our attack that accounts for this.
When the results of the queries Q j and Q′j are rounded, the
corresponding q j might not be identical if x(s) = 0. However,
the q js will vary less if x(s) = 1 than if x(s) = 0. Hence, instead
of checking if q1 = . . .= q|∆|, we check if the q j values are
“similar” to one another. While for high values of k this is
easy to detect, the total variance of the noise for low values
of k is small, making it harder to distinguish between the two
hypotheses (i.e. whether the q j values are “similar” or not).
To overcome this issue, we “amplify” the noise for each query:
instead of adding a single dummy condition ∆ j to the queries
for Q j and Q′j, we add the conjunction ∧l 6= j∆l :
Q j ≡ count
(
A′ = x(A
′)∧
∧
l 6= j
∆l ∧ s = 0
)
(13)
Q′j ≡ count
(
A′ = x(A
′)∧
∧
l 6= j
∆l ∧u 6= x(u)∧ s = 0
)
(14)
This increases the total variance of the noise in q j in the
x(s) = 0 case, making it easy to distinguish between the two
hypotheses: all the q j values will be very similar if x(s)= 1 and
fluctuate heavily if x(s)= 0. Measuring the sample variance S2
of {q j}1≤ j≤|∆|, we infer that x(s) = 1 if S2 ≤ σ∗, and x(s) = 0
otherwise with a cutoff threshold σ∗ chosen by the attacker
(see Appendix B for an empirical analysis of σ∗). The cloning
attack is described in detail in the procedure CloningAttack.
Procedure CloningAttack(A′,u,x(A′,u),∆,s,v)
Input: known attributes (names A′,u and values x(A′,u)),
dummy conditions ∆, secret s and target value v
Output: True if x(s) = v, False if x(s) 6= v
1 for j← 1 to |∆| do
2 ϕ← A′ = x(A′)∧∧l 6= j∆l
3 Q˜← count(ϕ∧ s 6= v)
4 Q˜′← count
(
ϕ∧u 6= x(u)∧ s 6= v
)
5 q j← Q˜− Q˜′
6 end for
7 r← 1|∆| ∑
|∆|
j=1 q j, S
2← 1|∆|−1 ∑
|∆|
j=1(q j− r)2
8 return S2 ≤ σ∗
Automated validation of the assumption. The cloning at-
tack relies on two assumptions on the attacker’s background
knowledge x(A
′,u):
1. The queries {Q j}1≤ j≤|∆| and {Q′j}1≤ j≤|∆| in equations
(13) and (14) are not bucket suppressed.
2. The user is value-unique in the dataset according to
(A′,u) for the secret attribute s.
We here propose procedures for an attacker to determine
whether (A′,u) satisfies the two assumptions with high proba-
bility.
Validating the first assumption can be done easily by sub-
mitting queries {Q j}1≤ j≤|∆| and {Q′j}1≤ j≤|∆| to Diffix. Re-
call that the threshold for bucket suppression for a query de-
pends only on the corresponding query set. All the queries in
{Q j}1≤ j≤|∆| have the same query set, and the same applies for
{Q′j}1≤ j≤|∆|. Hence, if any query Q j is bucket suppressed (i.e.
has output zero), then all queries in {Q j}1≤ j≤|∆| must have
output zero, and similarly for {Q′j}1≤ j≤|∆|. Thus, if any query
Q j and any query Q′j have output higher than zero, we are sure
that no query was bucket suppressed, and hence all q j’s are
valid samples. The test is considered passed in this case, and
failed otherwise. See the algorithm NoBucketSuppression for
an implementation example.
Validating the second assumption relies on a heuristic. We
run the query:
count(A′ = x(A
′)∧u = x(u))
and consider the assumption validated if the output is zero, and
not otherwise. The idea is that if the output is larger than zero,
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then the query was not bucket suppressed, and many users are
likely share the same attributes x(A
′,u), meaning that x(A
′,u) is
unlikely to be value-unique. Experiments in section 4 show
that this heuristic works very well on real-world datasets.
Procedure NoBucketSuppression(A′,u,x(A′,u),∆,s,v)
Input: known attributes (names A′,u and values x(A′,u)),
dummy conditions ∆, secret s and target value v
Output: True if (A′,u) passes the tests and is deemed to
satisfy assumption 1, False otherwise
1 okQ← 0, okQ′ ← 0
2 for j← 1 to |∆| do
3 ϕ← A′ = x(A′)∧∧l 6= j∆l
4 Q˜← count(ϕ∧ s 6= v)
5 Q˜′← count
(
ϕ∧u 6= x(u)∧ s 6= v
)
6 if Q˜ > 0 then
7 okQ← 1
8 end if
9 if Q˜′ > 0 then
10 okQ′ ← 1
11 end if
12 end for
13 return okQ = 1 & okQ′ = 1
Procedure ValueUnique(A′,u,x(A′,u))
Input: known attributes (names A′,u and values x(A′,u))
Output: True if (A′,u) passes the tests and is deemed to
satisfy assumption 2, False otherwise
1 Q˜← count(A′ = x(A′)∧u = x(u))
2 return Q˜ = 0
The procedures CloningAttack and NoBucketSuppression
both issue (the same) 2|∆| queries, while ValueUnique uses
only one query. Validating the assumptions and performing
the attack thus requires only 2|∆|+1 queries, for a given set
of attributes (A′,u). We empirically obtain accuracy above
93.3% with |∆| as low as 10 (see section 4 and Appendix E).
Full cloning attack. Combining procedures CloningAttack,
NoBucketSuppression and ValueUnique, we design a fully
fledged procedure FullCloningAttack that performs the entire
attack under the following assumptions:
H1 The attacker knows that the victim’s record x is in the
dataset.
H2 The attacker knows a set A∗ of the correct attributes for
the victim with |A∗|= k∗, i.e. the background knowledge
is x(A
∗).
H3 The secret attribute x(s) is a binary attribute.
The full cloning attack includes a subset exploration step
similar to the one used in the full differential attack. The
algorithm selects random subsets A′ of A∗ (and an element
u from A∗ \A′ at random) by decreasing size until it finds a
subset that passes both tests, upon which it then performs the
attack using x(A
′,u) as background knowledge. If no feasible
subset is found, the algorithm outputs NonAttackable.
Procedure FullCloningAttack(A∗,x(A∗),∆,s,v)
Input: known attributes (names A∗ and values x(A∗)),
dummy conditions ∆, secret s and target value v
Output: True if x(s) = v, False if x(s) 6= v
1 for k← |A∗| to 1 do
2 for iter← 1 to 100 do
3 A′← RandomSubsetOfSize(A∗,k−1)
4 u← RandomElement(A∗ \A′)
5 if NoBucketSuppression(A′,u,x(A),∆,s,v) and
ValueUnique(A′,u,x(A∗)) then
6 return CloningAttack(A′,u,x(A),∆,s,v)
7 end if
8 end for
9 end for
10 return NonAttackable
Reducing the number of queries. While Diffix allows each
analyst to send arbitrarily many queries, we study how many
queries are required to perform the cloning attack in practice.
In Appendix E we present a heuristic that reduces the median
number of queries by a factor of 100. Using this heuristic,
the attack targets 55.4% of the users in the dataset, achieving
91.7% accuracy with a maximum of 32 queries per user in
our experiments.
4 Experiments
In order to assess the effectiveness of our attacks, we imple-
mented Diffix’s mechanism for counting queries as described
in the original paper [18]. The implementation outputs zero
when queries are bucket-suppressed and results are rounded
to the nearest nonnegative integer. We apply our attacks to
four datasets and an additional synthetic dataset on which the
assumptions of the differential attack are always validated.
4.1 Description of the datasets
In our experiments, we use the following datasets:
1. ADULT: U.S. Census dataset with 30,162 records and
11 attributes, incl. salary class as secret attribute [26].
2. CREDIT: credit card application dataset with 690
records and 16 attributes, incl. accepted credit as secret
attribute [27].
9
3. CENSUS: U.S. Census dataset with 199,523 records and
42 attributes, incl. total personal income (digitized, null
income as negative condition) as secret attribute [28].
4. CDR: synthetic collection of phone metadata with
2,000,000 records generated using real-world data for
human behaviour and the geography of the UK for the lo-
cation of antennas. Every user is a record of 11,674,870
binary attributes (an attribute being whether a user was
geographically present at a certain place and time, and
placed a call or received a text message). As the vast
majority of the attributes in a record are null, the dis-
tribution of values for a random attribute is heavily
skewed towards zero. To obtain a balanced experiment,
for 50% of runs we select as the secret attribute a pair
(location, time) where the user was present, and for the
other 50% we select a pair where the user was absent.
4.2 Differential noise-exploitation attack
Evaluation of the attack alone. We first test the differen-
tial attack on a synthetic dataset where all users satisfy the
uniqueness assumption.
In the Completek dataset, every user is unique according
to k attributes (excluding the secret attribute), whereas k−1
attributes always identify a larger set of users. This ensures
that (i) every user is vulnerable to the attack and (ii) bucket
suppression is unlikely to be triggered by the attack queries.
To create the dataset, we fix an integer B and generate every
possible k−tuple whose values are in {1, . . . ,B}. We then
append to each tuple a random value of either 0 or 1 for
the secret attribute. Completek contains Bk records, one for
each combination of k attributes. For our experiments, we
set B = 12, to ensure that close to no bucket suppression
occurs. For computational reasons, as the size of the dataset
in memory grows as Bk, the maximum k we can use is limited
to 6.
Fig. 2 compares the accuracy acc(k) of the attack, knowing
k attributes, on Completek with the theoretical accuracy. The
procedure we use here is DifferentialAttack, which does not
include subset exploration and has no access to the oracle.
Hence, this experiment simulates a realistic attacker. We re-
port the empirical fraction of users whose secret attribute is
correctly predicted, estimated by performing the differential
attack on a sample of 1000 users. We also report the theoreti-
cal distribution of accuracy, (i) without rounding (closed-form
expression, see Appendix A) and (ii) with rounding (numeri-
cal simulation, see Appendix A). For the Completek dataset,
the accuracy reaches 92.6% for 5 points. Even knowing only
k = 2 attributes, the accuracy is above 66% both theoretically
and empirically. While rounding has close to no effect on the
theoretical accuracy of the attack, comparing the Completek
with the Theoretical (rounding) curves shows that bucket sup-
pression and potential correlations between the samples in
empirical experiments noticeably decrease the accuracy.
Evaluation on real-world datasets. We now evaluate the
accuracy of the differential attack on 1,000 users selected
at random in each of the four datasets. Contrary to the syn-
thetic experiment, bucket suppression is more prevalent on
real-world datasets. Therefore, we run the FullDifferentialAt-
tack algorithm, knowing k∗ attributes A∗ that are selected at
random for each record. If the attack outputs NonAttackable,
the secret attribute is predicted at random (uniformly).
Fig. 3 shows, for each dataset and knowing k∗ attributes,
the percentage of unique individuals and the percentage of
individuals, in each dataset, for which the secret is correctly
inferred. The latter divided by the former gives us the accu-
racy of our attack. Our attack realizes an accuracy of 68.4%
for ADULT with k∗ = 10, 64.0% for CREDIT with k∗ = 15,
68.8% for CENSUS with k∗ = 40, and 68.8% for CDR with
k∗ = 6.
Observe that the fraction of correctly inferred attributes
plateaus with larger k∗ for the CREDIT, CENSUS and CDR
datasets. The reason is that, on these datasets, most users are
unique for larger values of k∗. As explained in section 3, this
makes bucket suppression more prevalent and reduces the
total number of samples for the likelihood ratio test, which is
a limitation of the differential attack.
4.3 Cloning noise-exploitation attack
We implement the attack as described by algorithm Full-
CloningAttack. As before, for each value of k∗ we select
1,000 users at random, and for each user a random subset A∗
of their attributes of size k∗. A∗ represents the total number of
attributes known to the attacker about the victim.
We set a threshold σ∗ = 0.7 for the variance cutoff (see
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Figure 2: Accuracy of the differential attack when the unique-
ness assumption is always validated and with balanced truth
values. The baseline accuracy is 0.5 and represents the ex-
pected success rate when randomly predicting the secret at-
tribute using a uniform prior.
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Figure 3: Results of the differential attack for the (A) ADULT, (B) CREDIT, (C) CENSUS, and (D) CDR datasets.
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ADULT 10 93.0% 96.8% 93.3% 87.0%
CREDIT 15 100.0% 100.0% 97.0% 97.0%
CENSUS 40 99.7% 94.6% 97.1% 91.6%
CDR 6 100.0% 100.0% 91.3% 91.3%
Table 1: Empirical results of the cloning attack on four real-
world datasets.
Appendix B). We generate |∆| = 10 dummy conditions for
x1 = a1 of the form x1 6= b j for j ≤ |∆|, with b j being some
plausible values for x1 different from a1. We present the re-
sults when the attacker knows enough attributes (k∗) to iden-
tify every user, or up to all available attributes in the dataset.
Table 1 shows the proportion of records that are value-
unique (third column) and fraction of the value-unique records
that are predicted as attackable by procedures NoBucketSup-
pression and ValueUnique (fourth column). We then perform
the cloning attack on all records that are predicted as attack-
able and report accuracypa, the fraction of predicted attack-
able records whose secret attribute was successfully inferred
(fifth column). For completeness, we also report accuracyall,
the fraction of all records in the datasets (including the ones
deemed NonAttackable) whose secret attribute was success-
fully inferred (last column).
Table 1 shows that the cloning attack—including the as-
sumption validation step—performs really well on all datasets
considered, between 87.0 and 97.0% of secret attributes and
97.0% on the CREDIT dataset when knowing 15 attributes.
Fig. 4 shows, knowing k∗ attributes, the fraction of all
records that are value-unique, predicted attackable, and cor-
rectly inferred. The curves for value-unique users and for
predicted attackable users are always very close, suggesting
that the assumption validation step is effective. Out of all
records predicted as attackable, most of them are correctly in-
ferred, demonstrating that the attack works on targeted records
across all k. For the CREDIT dataset, with only six attributes,
the attack reaches the inference step for 95% of the users in
the dataset, and correctly infers the secret attribute for 93%
of the total records.
5 Discussion
5.1 Value-uniqueness and attribute predictability
Value-uniqueness plays an important role in the cloning
attack. As Fig. 4 shows, it is a valid assumption for real-world
datasets.
Value-uniqueness means that a group of people who share
the same attributes also share the same secret attribute. If
this group were to be large enough, the noise added by Diffix
might not be enough to hide the secret attribute, which could
then be revealed by using a simple count query. While this
might be true for some datasets, it is not the case for any of
the datasets we considered. For instance, the average size
of the value-unique class (i.e. the set of value-unique users
sharing the same restricted record) in the ADULT dataset is
1.44, with no class containing more than 4 users and similar
numbers for the other datasets. This means that, most of the
times, value-unique users are simply unique.
If secret attributes are predictable from the other attributes,
a trained machine learning classifier could predict them with
potentially high accuracy2. Despite our datasets coming from
the machine learning literature, our attack does not rely at all
on the predictability of secret attributes and performs equally
well if no correlation at all exists between attributes and the
secret attribute. In Appendix C, we run our attack on a modi-
fied version of the ADULT dataset where sensitive attributes
have been randomly sampled, thereby theoretically destroying
2Whether this would constitute a privacy attack is debated [29].
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Figure 4: Results of the cloning attack for the (A) ADULT, (B) CREDIT, (C) CENSUS, and (D) CDR datasets.
any correlation. Our attacks perform as well on this modified
dataset as on the original dataset.
5.2 Producing and detecting dummy conditions
The cloning attack requires the attacker to provide a set
of dummy conditions that affect the noise addition without
affecting the query set. These conditions can be syntactic (e.g.,
age ≥ 15 for the query age = 23), semantic (e.g., status 6=
retired for age = 23), or pragmatic (e.g., age 6= 15 against a
database containing only adult individuals).
When the language is rich enough, detecting redundant
clauses is not a trivial task. At the same time, the richer the
syntax is, the more utility an analyst gets out of the system.
Diffix offers a fairly rich syntax including boolean expression,
GROUP BY, JOIN, seven aggregation functions, set mem-
bership, fourteen string functions, and ten maths functions.
In this context, automatically detecting dummy conditions
would likely require iterating recursively through every condi-
tion and evaluating the query with and without them, a costly
operation. Moreover, if dummy conditions are detected by
evaluating them on the dataset, filtering them might not be
safe. Removing semantic and pragmatic dummy conditions
from a query would indeed reduce the total variance of the
added noise and leak information about the dataset itself (e.g.,
only adult individuals are present if the condition age 6= 15 is
always removed).
5.3 Improving the attacks
The cloning attack can be modified to run a double NoBuck-
etSuppression test: once with v = 0 and once with v = 1. If
both pass and the ValueUnique test is passed as well, the attack
proceeds with the actual inference procedure CloningAttack
for both v = 0 and v = 1. The attack then makes a guess only
if both inferences return the same value, and continues with
the subset exploration otherwise (deeming the user NonAt-
tackable if no working set of attributes is found).
We found that this modified attack improves the accuracypa
figure on all datasets (e.g. from 93.3% to 97.3% for ADULT,
all results available in Appendix D). However, double tests
are more likely to fail, meaning that less users are predicted
as attackable (from 96.8% to 87% in ADULT). Because
of bucket suppression, this effect is particularly strong for
datasets where the overall distribution of the secret attribute
is very skewed, such as the CDR dataset where the number of
predicted attackable users goes from 100% to 8.5%. Depend-
ing on the aims of the attacker (precision versus coverage),
she might prefer the original or the double version of the
cloning attack.
Other improvements. To properly quantify the strength of
our attacks, none of them use prior knowledge on the distribu-
tion of the secret attribute. In practice, an attacker might want
to use this information, e.g. obtaining it by querying Diffix.
We discuss this in Appendix D. We also discuss how to gen-
erate more samples for the differential attack and outline how
to generalize both attacks to infer non-binary attributes.
5.4 Defenses
In this section, we briefly outline some of the approaches
that may be used to mitigate the effects of our noise-
exploitations attacks – and other attacks – against Diffix and
other privacy-preserving query-based systems. Overall, it is
our belief that practical secure design principles apply here
just as they do in many other contents. Specifically, privacy-
preserving query-based system such as Diffix (regardless of
whether they have provable guarantees or not) would benefit
from a defense-in-depth approach, by monitoring the query
stream for queries that are likely to lead to exploitation.
Intrusion detection. The set of queries generated by our at-
tacks follow a specific template. Learning this pattern may
help prevent noise-exploitation attacks, as well as potentially
related attacks. A more sophisticated attacker might however
vary the shape of the queries and interleave them with other
more natural-looking queries, including over long periods of
time.
Auditability. If the user of such a system is authenticated,
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then a suspicious-looking query stream can lead to temporary
account suspension and further investigations of their activity,
including after the fact, as new attacks are being uncovered.
Increased friction. Another strategy involves imposing time
delays or financial charges on queries, for instance by charging
by the number of queries, instead of using a subscription-
based model. This strategy can be refined to, for instance,
charge more or create longer delays for suspicious queries.
This would make it more difficult to automate the inference
process at scale.
Limited expressiveness. Instead of a rich syntax, the mecha-
nism could allow only for a small set of conditions that are
easier to validate. This could also include a limit to the number
of conditions per query, or to the total number of conditions
that may be used by the authenticated system user during a
specific interval of time. This involves a compromise between
rough data summarization and fine-grained queries, and limits
the utility of the system in practice.
5.5 Disclosure
After we discovered and prototyped our differential attack,
we reached out to the authors of Diffix and shared with them
our manuscript, which subsequently appeared on ArXiv.org. A
week later, the authors of Diffix published a blog post on their
website [30] discussing our results. While they acknowledge
our attack, they claim that it is not practical as the necessary
assumptions are rarely met in the datasets they analyzed.
We disagree with this claim. First, the existence of the at-
tack, independently of the dataset, contradicts both the spirit
and the letter of GDPR’s Art. 29 WP. Second, we showed that,
albeit correct, the authors’ analysis was insufficient. In this
paper, we give an example of a dataset on which the differen-
tial attack is very effective, even without an oracle. Moreover,
we demonstrate that there exist real-world datasets on which
the necessary assumptions are met for a significant fraction
of users. Third, the cloning attack, which we developed after-
wards, is able to validate its assumptions automatically and
performs very well on a large range of real-world datasets.
The code of our differential and cloning attacks, as well
as the experiments performed in this paper, are available at
https://cpg.doc.ic.ac.uk/signal-in-the-noise.
6 Related work
Attacks on query-based systems. Diffix is an example of
query-based system: the individual-level (often pseudony-
mous) data is stored on the data curator’s server. Users access
the data exclusively by sending queries that only return in-
formation aggregated from several records. While this setup
prevents traditional re-identification attacks [4–9], a large
range of attacks on query-based systems have been developed
since the late 70’s [25, 31]. Most of these attacks show how
to circumvent privacy safeguards (for instance, query set size
restriction and noise addition) in specific setups. In 2003,
Dinur et al. [32] proposed the first example of an attack that
works on a large class of query-based systems. In what they
called a reconstruction attack, they showed that if the noise
added to every query is at most o(
√
n), where n is the size of
the dataset, then an attacker can reconstruct almost the entire
dataset using only polynomially many queries. Sankararaman
et al. [33] realized the first formal study of tracing attacks,
introducing a theoretical attack model based on hypothesis
testing. While reconstruction attacks aim at inferring one
or more attributes of some record in the dataset (violating
the inference requirement of the Art. 29 WP), the goal of
tracing attacks is only to determine whether the data about
a certain individual (more precisely, their record) is present
in the dataset. Numerous reconstruction and tracing attacks
have been proposed in the literature. These attacks address
different limitations of previous ones, particularly the com-
putational time required to perform them. A recent survey
from Dwork et al. [34] gives a detailed overview of attacks
on query-based systems.
Attacks on differential privacy. Differential privacy is a pri-
vacy guarantee that can be enforced by query-based systems.
Differential privacy has been mathematically proven to be
robust against a very large class of attacks [12] when used
with an appropriate privacy budget ε. However, research has
shown that attacks on implementations of differentially pri-
vate systems exist. We give an overview in Appendix F.
Differential privacy for general-purpose analytics. Diffix
was specifically created as an alternative to differential privacy
to provide a better privacy/utility tradeoff for general-purpose
analytics [35, 36]. Specifically, Diffix allows for infinitely
many queries with little noise added to outputs.
General-purpose analytics usually refers to systems that
allow analysts to send many queries of different type, and ide-
ally permit to join different datasets. Some solutions based on
differential privacy have been proposed, the main ones being
PINQ [37], wPINQ [38], Airavat [39], and GUPT [40]. All
of these systems however present limitations, e.g. simplicity
of use and support for various operators that join different
datasets [13]. In 2017, Johnson et al. [13] proposed a new
framework for general-purpose analytics, called FLEX, devel-
oped in collaboration with Uber. FLEX enforces differential
privacy for SQL queries without requiring any knowledge
about differential privacy from the analyst. However, the ac-
tual utility achieved – level of noise added – by the current
implementation of FLEX has been questioned [41].
Attacks on data-dependent noise. Values of Diffix’s dy-
namic noise for a query depend on the query set (i.e. the
set of users selected by the query), and hence on the data.
This is what allows for our noise-exploitation attack to work.
Data-dependent noise, also called instance-based noise, has
been shown to provide significantly better accuracy than data-
independent noise [42]. However, naive implementations of
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data-dependent noise can leak information about the data,
a result Nissim et al. theorized as a potential way to attack
the system [42]. To the best of our knowledge, our noise-
exploitation attack is the first instance of an attack exploiting
specifically data-dependent noise on deployed systems.
6.1 Other attacks on Diffix
We published the first version of our paper on ArXiv.org
in April 2018, describing the differential attack. We updated
it with a cloning attack in July 2018. Two months later, in
October 2018, two other attacks on Diffix were disclosed. A
membership attack by Pyrgelis et al. [43], based on a pre-
vious paper [44], and a reconstruction attack by Cohen and
Nissim [45], based on previous work by Dinur et al. [32] and
Dwork et al. [46]. These attacks are very different from ours
and require a large number of queries in a typical setting,
while our cloning attack can work with only 32 queries (see
Appendix E). These are, to the best of our knowledge, the
only three attacks specifically targeting Diffix.
Membership attack on location data. The attack by Pyrge-
lis et al. [43] is as follows: the attacker trains a machine
learning algorithm on a linkability dataset (the attacker’s
background knowledge) to infer the presence of a user in
a protected dataset (accessible only through queries on Dif-
fix). Both datasets contain the full trajectories of users and
half of the users are present in both datasets. The classifier
is trained on the linkability dataset and queries on Diffix that
count the number of people transiting in a certain area at a
given time. The experimental results focus on the top 100
users with the highest number of reported locations in the
linkability dataset. Out of 62 users present in both datasets,
the classifier correctly infers the presence for 50 of them.
This attack presents three limitations. First, it is a mem-
bership attack and only allows an attacker to infer whether a
person is in the protected dataset or not. Second, it assumes a
strong adversary who has access to the full trajectory of a user
exactly as it exists in the protected dataset, for a large number
of users. Third, the attack requires about 32,000 queries to as-
sess the presence of a user. Membership attacks are however
very useful when combined with inference attacks like ours,
allowing an adversary to effectively verify our assumption
that the victim is in the dataset.
Linear program reconstruction attack. The attack by Co-
hen et al. [45] focuses on reconstructing the dataset. In its
simplest form, the attack assumes that the dataset contains n
records, and each user i ∈ [n] has a binary attribute si. The at-
tack then selects random subsets of users and, for each subset
I ⊆ [n], queries Diffix for the result of ∑i∈I si. This allows the
attacker to produce a noisy linear system that can be solved
using linear programming techniques to reconstruct the entire
set of secret attributes {s1, . . . ,sn} with perfect accuracy in
polynomial time.
While this attack can successfully reconstruct the entire
dataset, it presents two limitations compared to our attack.
First, it requires that the system allows queries of the type
∑i∈I si, i.e. queries that select any analyst-defined set of users
I ⊆ [n], the “row-naming problem”. The authors here exploit
SQL functions supported by Diffix to define hash functions
which they then use to select “random enough” sets of users.
Following the disclosure, Aircloak restricted the available
SQL functions to prevent the attack [47].
Second, to target a specific user, the attack would require
a number of queries proportional to the number of records.
Since the attacker does not know which name i ∈ [n] corre-
sponds to the victim’s record, it is necessary to fully recon-
struct at least a few columns entirely. The attacker would then
perform a uniqueness attack on the reconstructed dataset to
infer the secret attribute of the victim.
On the contrary, the number of queries used by our attacks
is independent of the number of records in the dataset.
7 Conclusion
The Diffix mechanism has recently been proposed as an
alternative to data anonymization methods and differential
privacy, and is currently used in production. The mechanism
is claimed to allow an analyst to submit an unbounded num-
ber of queries, while thwarting inference attacks, as defined
by EU’s Art. 29 WP. In this paper, we show that Diffix’s
anonymization mechanism is vulnerable to a new class of
attacks, which we call noise-exploitation attacks. Our attacks
leverage design flaws in Diffix’s data-dependent noise to infer
private attributes of an individual in the dataset, solely from
prior knowledge about other attributes of this individual. In
our opinion, Diffix alone and in its present state likely fails to
satisfy the EU’s Art. 29 WP requirements for data anonymiza-
tion. Furthermore, our results show that naive data-dependent
noise leads to highly vulnerable systems.
Our differential noise-exploitation attack, given little auxil-
iary information about the victim, combines specific queries
and estimates how the noise is distributed to infer the value
of the private attribute. In a synthetic best-case dataset, the
attacker can predict with 92.6% accuracy private attributes,
using only 5 attributes.
Our cloning noise-exploitation attack extends the first one
by adding “dummy” conditions that do not change the se-
lected query set. It relies on weaker assumptions, that are
automatically validated with high accuracy by our algorithm.
We evaluate its performances on four real-world datasets and
find that it infers private attributes of between 87.0% and
97.0% of all records across datasets.
We finally recommend four defense-in-depth principles to
defeat the de-anonymization attacks we describe.
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A Likelihood ratio test
Let X and Y be independent random variables. Suppose
that we have two hypotheses about the distributions of X and:
H0 : X ∼N (µ0,σ20) and Y ∼N (µ1,σ21)
H1 : X ∼N (µ1,σ21) and Y ∼N (µ0,σ20)
where µ0,µ1,σ0,σ1 are known and fixed values such that µ0 <
µ1 and σ20 < σ
2
1.N (µ,σ2) denotes the the normal distribution
with mean µ and variance σ2.
Suppose we have a vector of n realizations x = (x1, . . . ,xn)
of X and a vector of n realizations y = (y1, . . . ,yn) of Y . We
assume that all the 2n realizations are mutually independent.
The standard frequentist way to accept the preferred hypothe-
sis H0 or refute it (in favor of H1) would use a likelihood ratio
test with a pre-defined confidence level from which to derive
critical regions [48]. In our case we do not have a preferred
hypothesis, and hence we define a slightly different test.
Let f and g denote the probability density functions of
N (µ0,σ20) and N (µ1,σ21) respectively. We define the likeli-
hood ratio function Λ as follows:
Λ(x,y) =
n
∏
j=1
f (x j)
g(x j)
n
∏
j=1
g(y j)
f (y j)
.
We accept H0 if Λ(x,y)≥ 1, and we accept H1 if Λ(x,y)< 1.
Theoretical accuracy of the test. The test will sometimes
yield the wrong result. It is possible to determine what is the
probability that this happens. Such probability depends on
mean and variance of the two specific normal distributions.
Fact. Let perr0 = Pr[Λ(x,y) < 1 | H0] and perr1 =
Pr[Λ(x,y)≥ 1 | H1]. Then
perr0 = perr1 = Pr[α0Z0−α1Z1 < 0]
where, for i = 0,1, Zi is a noncentral chi-squared distribution
with n degrees of freedom and noncentrality parameter
λi = n
(
µi
σi
+
µ0σ21−µ1σ20
σi(σ20−σ21)
)2
and
αi =
σ20−σ21
2σ21−i
.
To prove the fact, one considers the log-likelihood ratio func-
tion logΛ(x,y) and applies elementary algebra to the obtained
expression to derive a linear combination of noncentral chi-
squared distributions. We omit the details.
Since perr0 = perr1 , we refer to this quantity simply as perr.
The accuracy of the test is acc = 1− perr.
We now show how to apply the fact to our differential noise-
exploitation attack. For simplicity, we suppose that Diffix’s
outputs are not rounded to the nearest nonnegative integer
and bucket suppression is never triggered for the queries in
the attack, so that every pair of queries (Q˜ j, Q˜′j) and (R˜ j, R˜′j)
yields a valid sample. Thus, for k known attributes, we have
two vectors of samples q = (q1, . . . ,qk) and r = (r1, . . . ,rk)
and for every j ≤ k:
q j ∼
{
N (0,2) if x(s) = 1
N (1,2k+2) if x(s) = 0
r j ∼
{
N (1,2k+2) if x(s) = 1
N (0,2) if x(s) = 0
We assume that the 2k samples in q and r are mutually inde-
pendent. As discussed in section 3, this is not always guar-
anteed to be true, but it has close to no effect on the actual
accuracy of the test. Let
H0 : x(s) = 1
H1 : x(s) = 0.
Let f and g denote the probability density functions of
N (0,2) andN (1,2k+2) respectively. Observe that H0 holds
if and only if every q j ∼ f and every r j ∼ g. Similarly, H1
holds if and only if every q j ∼ g and every r j ∼ f . Then we
can apply the test defined above. Define
Λ(q,r) =
k
∏
j=1
f (q j)
g(q j)
k
∏
j=1
g(r j)
f (r j)
.
Our test concludes that x(s) = 1 if Λ(q,r)≥ 1, and x(s) = 0 if
Λ(q,r)< 1.
To measure the theoretical accuracy of the attack for k
known attributes, we can apply the fact to Λ(q,r) with
µ0 = 0,σ20 = 2,µ1 = 1,σ
2
1 = 2k+ 2 and n = k, and finally
find acc(k) = 1− perr(k).
17
Fig. 2 shows the values of acc(k) for increasing values of
k. Computing the value of perr requires an approximation of
the cumulative distribution function of a linear combination
of noncentral chi-squared distributions, for which an exact
closed-form expression is not known [49]. We compute these
values using the R package sadists3 version 0.2.3.
Numerical simulation with rounding. If we suppose that
Diffix’s outputs are rounded to the nearest nonnegative integer,
no simple expression can be determined for the error rate. To
estimate the accuracy in this case, we numerically simulate the
values of Q˜ j(D) and Q˜′j(D) that would result from querying
Diffix (without bucket suppression), for different values of
the secret attribute x(s). We then obtain each sample as the
difference of the rounded results:
q j = round(Q˜ j(D))− round(Q˜′j(D)).
Finally, we perform the likelihood ratio test as for the contin-
uous case (considering also null outputs) and check whether
the result is correct. We use balanced truth values for x(s),
and perform 1000 experiments (on different queries) for each
value of x(s). The results are shown in Fig. 2.
B Cutoff threshold for the cloning attack
The cloning attack tests whether the empirical variance of
|∆| samples is higher than a cutoff threshold σ∗. In order to
choose this threshold σ∗, we simulate the noises and samples
that would result from Diffix queries. We use the expressions
resulting from equations (13) and (14), introducing the round-
ing operator round(·) that rounds to the nearest nonnegative
integer.
For j = 1, . . . , |∆|, we have:
Q˜ j(D) = round
(
Q j(D)
+ ∑
i=1,i 6= j
static[∆i]+ ∑
i=1,i6= j
dynamic[∆i]
+ static[A′ = x(A
′)∧ s = 0]
+dynamic[A′ = x(A
′)∧ s = 0]
)
and, with q = Q j(D) if x(s) = 1 or q = Q′j(D) otherwise:
Q˜′j(D) = round
(
q
+ ∑
i=1,i 6= j
static[∆i]+ ∑
i=1,i 6= j
dynamic[∆i]
+ static[A′ = x(A
′)∧ s = 0]
+dynamic[A′ = x(A
′)∧ s = 0]
+ static[u 6= x(u)]+dynamic[u 6= x(u)]
)
3https://github.com/shabbychef/sadists
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Figure 5: Influence of the variance cutoff σ∗ on the accuracy
of the classification for the cloning attack with |∆|= 10. The
samples are obtained by simulating Diffix results (Q j,Q′j)
from their distribution, using different values of the number
of attributes k and the true user set size Q.
We perform a balanced experiment, simulating 1000 set of
answers for x(s) = 1 and 1000 set of answers for x(s) = 0.
For each sample, we generate the different static and dy-
namic noises once by sampling each from N (0,1), and use
these values to compute the pairs (Q˜ j, Q˜′j). Without loss
of generality, since we only measure the variance, we fix
Q j(D) = Q′j(D)+1. We then compute the sample variance
of
(
Q˜1− Q˜′1, . . . , Q˜|∆|− Q˜′|∆|
)
.
Fig. 5 shows the accuracy at correctly predicting whether
x(s) = 1 or x(s) = 0 from the variance of the |∆| pairs. We find
that, for |∆|= 10 (10 dummy queries) and a query set of size
10, selecting σ∗ = 0.7 leads to a 98.2% true positive rate for
a 98.4% true negative rate despite rounding. This choice is
arbitrary, and an attacker could choose a different value for
different true and false positive rates. We however argue that
the attack is robust to the choice of σ∗: while 0.7 seems to
overall maximize accuracy, values of the threshold between
0.4 and 1 have comparable accuracy.
C Size of value-unique classes and cloning at-
tack on randomized dataset
Size of value-unique classes. Fig. 6 shows the distribution of
the size of value-unique classes of users predicted attackable
by the cloning attack (using all attributes). In most cases, the
restricted record used by the cloning attack uniquely identifies
the victim and the victim’s value-unique class never contains
more than 5 users.
Randomized dataset. Our attacks do not rely at all on the
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Figure 6: Size of value-unique classes for users predicted attackable by the cloning attack (using all attributes) on the (A) ADULT,
(B) CREDIT, (C) CENSUS, and (D) CDR datasets.
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Figure 7: Results of the cloning attack for the ADULT and
the ADULT-randomized datasets.
predictability of secret attributes and perform equally well if
no correlation exists between attributes and the secret attribute.
We create a modified version of the ADULT dataset where
the secret attributes have been randomly sampled (0 or 1
with equal probability), which we call ADULT-randomized.
Fig. 7 shows that our cloning attack achieves roughly the same
accuracy on both datasets, and similarly for the differential
attack (Fig. 8).
D Improving the accuracy and generalizing to
non-binary attributes
Double cloning attack. The cloning attack can be modified
using a double test, as explained in section 5.3. We implement
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Figure 8: Results of the differential attack for the ADULT and
the ADULT-randomized datasets.
this attack and perform it on all four datasets. The results
are reported in Table 2. Comparing these results with the
ones for the single cloning attack (Table 1), we observe that
accuracypa is slightly higher on all datasets, but less users are
predicted attackable on all but the CREDIT dataset. The issue
is particularly evident on the CDR dataset, where the figure
drops from 100% to 8.5%. The reason is that the distribution
of the secret attribute in the CDR dataset is extremely skewed
towards 0. This means that the part of the attack using v = 1
is likely to fail, due to many queries being bucket suppressed.
Prior knowledge. The differential attack and the cloning at-
tack do not assume any prior knowledge about the distribution
of the attribute s in the population (i.e. in the dataset). In
some cases, one outcome of s could be much more likely than
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ADULT 10 87.0% 86.2% 97.3% 74.0%
CREDIT 11 100.0% 100.0% 99.0% 99.0%
CENSUS 45 100.0% 87.0% 98.9% 86.0%
CDR 6 100.0% 8.5% 94.1% 8.0%
Table 2: Empirical results of the double cloning attack, using
all attributes.
the other. For example, if the secret attribute is HIV and the
dataset is randomly sampled from the population, it is more
likely to observe HIV = 0 rather than HIV = 1. This prior
knowledge about the population can be obtained empirically
by querying the dataset itself, using count(HIV = 0). This
test can be easily integrated in the likelihood ratio test using
Bayes’ rule. For simplicity, we do not employ this improve-
ment and we rather use an uninformative (uniform) prior.
Obtaining more samples for the differential attack. The
differential attack relies on a likelihood ratio test with 2k sam-
ples, where k is the number of uniquely identifying attributes.
There exist several ways to generate even more samples and
thus increase the attack accuracy, useful when k is small or
too many queries are bucket suppressed.
Consider again equations (7) and (8) for queries Q j and
Q′j. The main property of Q j and Q′j is Q j(D)−Q′j(D) =
Q(D), where Q(D) is the value we want to infer. There are
many other pairs of queries that satisfy the same requirement
and will be processed independently. For example, one could
define Pj(D) by adding the condition a j ≤ x j to Q j and P′j(D)
by replacing a j 6= x j with a j < x j in Q′j. The record x is still
the only user that can differ from one query to the other, and
thus Pj(D)−P′j(D) = Q(D). By an argument similar to the
one for Q1 and Q′1, we obtain:
P˜j(D)− P˜′j(D)∼
{
N (0,4) if x(s) = 1
N (1,2k+2) if x(s) = 0.
Repeating this for j = 1, . . . ,k yields 2k additional samples.
Note that, as we add one condition, this creates two indepen-
dent noises which will not cancel out. We can furthermore
repeat the same procedure, inverting the inequalities to obtain
2k additional samples, leading to a total of 6k samples.
In general, 2k samples can be obtained from any pair of
queries that define a partitioning attack for Q; different math-
ematical operators could also be employed to construct such
partitions. Such samples will be independent most of the time.
One could further exploit Diffix’s rich SQL syntax by writing
conditions with different syntax but identical meaning. For ex-
ample, we could replace every condition “ai = xi” with “ai IN
(xi)”, and similarly “ai 6= xi” with “ai NOT IN (xi)”. Since
both static and dynamic noise layers depend on the string that
defines the condition, changing the SQL expression produces
independent noise values.
Extending the attacks to non-binary attributes. The differ-
ential and cloning attacks, as presented, assume that the secret
attribute is binary. This is a common assumption in the litera-
ture [32, 34], as it is generally possible to extend the attacks
to non-binary attributes. We now outline, using a bisection
search, how to adapt our noise-exploitation attacks for secret
attributes that take values in the set of real numbers (or any set
with a defined order). First, we modify our noise-exploitation
attacks to test whether the secret attribute is smaller or larger
than a certain starting value t0. To do this, it is sufficient to
change the condition s = 0 to s≤ t0 (or s≥ t0) in each attack
query (7), (8), (13), (14). We then find the correct value (up to
the desired accuracy) using a bisection search that iterates the
attack with the right condition s≤ ti or s≥ ti. Since the attack
does not achieve perfect accuracy, each step is associated to
a probability of success. This stochastic root-finding search
can be solved with a probabilistic bisection algorithm (see
e.g. Frazier et al. [50]).
E Reducing the number of queries
One of the main features of Diffix is that it allows analysts
to send an unlimited amount of queries. Many privacy attacks
work by issuing a relatively large number of queries (see
also 6.1). Limiting the number of queries allowed by Diffix
would thwart or significantly affect these attacks. While our
actual attack procedures require a small number of queries
(2|∆|+1 for the cloning attack), the subset exploration step
can sometimes explore many sets of attributes before finding
an exploitable one. To minimize the number of queries, we
replace the iterative exploration with a greedy heuristic that
selects only one subset which is likely to work. We focus only
on the cloning attack, as it does not require an oracle and
achieves much better accuracy.
The cloning attack requires a set of attributes (A′,u), where
the restricted record x(A
′,u) uniquely identifies the victim, but
the vector x(A
′) is shared across a larger population (to avoid
bucket suppression). The FullCloningAttack starts with a
larger set of attributes A∗ and iteratively explores subsets of
A∗ to find a candidate (A′,u). We replace this iterative process
with a single deterministic step.
Intuitively, we want u to be as discriminative as possible,
while for the attributes in A′ to select as many users as possible.
This is what the procedure GreedySelectSubset does. First,
it computes the (approximate) fraction of users that share
the same value x(a), for each attribute a ∈ A∗. Then it selects
as u the attribute associated with the lowest fraction. Now
suppose that N is the estimated total number of users in the
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dataset. The set A′ is selected as the smallest set of attributes
associated with the highest fraction, additionally requiring
that the product of all the fractions for (A′,u) is smaller than
1/N. This ensures that, with high probability, the victim is
uniquely identified by x(A
′,u).
Procedure GreedySelectSubset(A∗,x(A∗),s,v)
Input: known attributes (names A∗ and values x(A∗)),
secret s and target value v
Output: a set of attributes (A′,u)⊆ A∗
1 N← count() // approx. tot. number of users
2 foreach a ∈ A∗ do
3 Ca← count(a = x(a)∧ s 6= v)
4 ρa← CaN
5 end foreach
6 {ρ1, . . . ,ρ|A∗|}← SortDescendingOrder({ρa}a∈A∗)
7 u← a|A∗|
8 i← 1, A′← /0
9 while ρu∏ai∈A′ ρai >
1
N do
10 A′← A′∪{ai}
11 i← i+1
12 end while
13 return (A′,u)
We can modify the FullDifferentialAttack replacing the
subset exploration with this heuristic. The modified full attack
is described in the GreedyFullCloningAttack procedure.
Procedure GreedyFullCloningAttack(A∗,x(A∗),∆,s,v)
Input: known attributes (names A∗ and values x(A∗)),
dummy conditions ∆, secret s and target value v
Output: True if x(s) = v, False if x(s) 6= v
1 (A′,u)← GreedySelectSubset(A∗,x(A∗),s,v)
2 if NoBucketSuppression(A′,u,x(A),∆,s,v) and
ValueUnique(A′,u,x(A∗)) then
3 return CloningAttack(A′,u,x(A),∆,s,v)
4 end if
5 return NonAttackable
Observe that the GreedySelectSubset procedure issues ex-
actly |A∗|+ 1 queries. The differential attack with the as-
sumption validation step issues at most 2|∆|+ 1 queries.
So, the GreedyFullCloningAttack algorithm requires at most
|A∗|+2|∆|+2 queries.
We compared the performances of the FullCloningAttack
and GreedyFullCloningAttack on the ADULT dataset, with
the salary class as secret attribute and the other 10 attributes
as A∗. As in section 4, we used |∆|= 10 dummy conditions
and ran the attack on 1000 random users. The results are
summarized in Table 3.
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Table 3: Empirical results of the cloning attack with iterative
subset exploration and with the heuristic subset selection.
The maximum (and median) number of queries used by
GreedyFullCloningAttack for a single user is 10+2×10+
2 = 32. The median number of queries used by GreedyFull-
CloningAttack is about 10 times higher, and the maximum is
100 times higher.
GreedyFullCloningAttack effectively attacks more than
half of the users, as opposed to 96.8% of the users for the
FullCloningAttack. This is due to the fact that the first attack
tries a single subset of attributes per user. However, this figure
is still remarkably high, given the huge reduction of required
queries. Finally, the accuracy of the inference for the attacked
users is almost the same.
We believe that these results give additional evidence
of the power, extendability and practicability of our noise-
exploitation attacks. Introducing additional optimizations, the
accuracy could be improved and the number of queries could
be further reduced (see Appendix D).
F Attacks on implementations of differential
privacy
While differential privacy provably protects against a very
large class of privacy attacks [12], the actual implemen-
tation of differentially private mechanisms can open new
vulnerabilities. Haeberlen et al. [16] exploited covert chan-
nels [51] in two popular implementations of differential pri-
vacy, PINQ [37] and Airavat [39], to design state- and timing-
based attacks, showing that implementation choices and bugs
can introduce vulnerability, effectively disrupting the theoreti-
cal guarantees that differentially private systems are supposed
to offer. Mironov showed that finite precision and rounding
effects of floating-point operations can undermine the actual
guarantees of differentially private mechanisms [15]. Finally,
Kifer et al. [52] argued that even perfect implementations
of differential privacy are vulnerable to some attacks if the
attacker has very powerful background knowledge, although
this is debated [53].
Attacks on implementations of differential privacy suggest
that no practical system is perfectly secure against any attack.
For this reason, we believe that differential privacy-based
systems could benefit from defence-in-depth measures such
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as the ones discussed in section 5.
In general, any query-based system—whether based on dif-
ferential privacy or not—stores sensitive data on the curator’s
servers. This constitutes a risk, as an attacker could try to
break into the server by exploiting vulnerabilities unrelated
to the query interface. Once an attacker obtains access to the
raw, potentially pseudonymized, individual-data, it is likely
very easy for them to re-identify users.
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